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V 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The names of all parties to the proceedings in the 
lower Court are set forth in the caption of the case on appeal• 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) as amended. 
S1ATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Gas-A-Mat Oil Corp* of Colorado. 
On the basis of the record before it, did the trial 
court, in granting Gas-A-Mat's Motion to Dismiss, correctly 
determine that the "dual capacity doctrine" did not apply to the 
allegations in plaintiff's Complaint? 
B. State Defendants/Appellees: 
Gas-A-Mat adopts appellants' Statement of the Issues with 
respect to the State defendants/appellees. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a 
question of law, this Honorable Court gives the trial court's 
ruling no deference and reviews it under a correctness standard. 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 
196 (Utah 1991). A Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss admits the 
facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiff's 
right to relief based on those facts. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
1 . Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 6 0 ( 1 9 5 3 ) : 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, 
or officer, agent or employee—Occupational 
disease accepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to 
the provisions of this title for injuries 
sustained by an employee, whether resulting 
in death or not, shall be the exclusive 
remedy against the employer and shall be the 
exclusive remedy against any officer, agent 
or employee of the employer and the 
liabilities of the employer imposed by this 
act shall be in place of any and all other 
civil liability whatsoever, at common law or 
otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, 
widow, children, parents, dependents, 
next-of-kin, heirs, personal representatives, 
guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on 
account of any accident or injury or death, 
in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated 
or incurred by such employee in the course of 
or because of or arising out of his 
employment, and no action at law may be 
maintained against an employer or against any 
officer, agent or employee of the employer 
based upon any accident, injury or death of 
an employee• . . . 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1953): 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by 
wrongful acts of persons other than employer, 
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officer, agent, or employee of said employer 
— Rights of employer or insurance carrier in 
cause of action — Maintenance of action — 
Notice of intention to proceed against third 
party — Right to maintain action not 
involving employee-employer relationship — 
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery. 
When any injury or death for which 
compensation is payable under this title 
shall have been caused by the wrongful act or 
neglect of a person other than an employer, 
officer, agent, or employee of said employer, 
the injured employee, or in case of death his 
dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal 
representative may also have an action for 
damages against such third person. If 
compensation is claimed and the employer or 
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay 
compensation, the employer or insurance 
carrier shall become trustee of the cause of 
action against the third party and may bring 
and maintain the action either in its own 
name or in the name of the injured employee, 
or his heirs or the personal representative 
of the deceased, provided the employer or 
carrier may not settle and release the cause 
of action without the consent of the 
commission. Before proceeding against the 
third party, the injured employee, or, in 
case of death, his heirs, shall give written 
notice of such intention to the carrier or 
other person obligated for the compensation 
payments, in order to give such person a 
reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance 
in the proceeding. 
For the purposes of this section and 
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or 
personal representative may also maintain an 
action for damages against subcontractors, 
general contractors, independent contractors, 
property owners or their lessees or assigns, 
not occupying an employee-employer 
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relationship with the injured or deceased 
employee at the time of his injury or death. 
If any recovery is obtained against such 
third person it shall be disbursed as 
follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the 
action, including attorneys7 fees, shall 
be paid and charged proportionately 
against the parties as their interests 
may appear. Any such fee chargeable to 
the employer or carrier is to be a 
credit upon any fee payable by the 
injured employee or, in the case of 
death, by the dependents, for any 
recovery had against the third party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation 
payments shall be reimbursed in full for 
all payments made less the proportionate 
share of costs and attorneys' fees 
provided for in Subsection (1). 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the 
injured employee or his heirs in case of 
death, to be applied to reduce or 
satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person 
liable for compensation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of 
Proceedings as Concerns Defendant Gas-A-Mat Corp. 
This is a wrongful death action arising out of the 
kidnapping and murder of Maurine Hunsaker. Mrs. Hunsaker was 
kidnapped while on duty from her place of employment, a Gas-A-Mat 
service station located at 3995 West 4700 South, Salt Lake 
4 
County, Utah. Mrs. Hunsaker was employed by Gas-A-Mat as a 
cashier, and her duties consisted primarily of monitoring the 
customers and receiving payment from them for the products 
purchased at the service station. It was undisputed in the trial 
court below that after the death of Mrs. Hunsaker, the plaintiffs 
in this case filed for workers compensation benefits under the 
Utah Workers Compensation Act and received those benefits. 
Notwithstanding plaintiff's invocation of the benefits afforded 
under the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, plaintiffs filed a 
complaint in which they named as a defendant, Mrs. Hunsaker's 
employer, Gas-A-Mat Corp. 
Plaintiffs specifically allege that in regard to 
Mrs. Hunsaker's employment, Gas-A-Mat was acting in a "dual 
capacity." Plaintiffs assert that Gas-A-Mat was acting as both 
gasoline retailer and as a provider of security for the 
individual Gas-A-Mat stations. 
Gas-A-Mat filed a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's claims 
asserting that the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act provides the 
exclusive remedy for the death of an employee and that the "dual 
capacity" doctrine does not provide an exception to the exclusive 
remedy provisions of the Act under Utah law. It is Gas-A-Mat's 
position that Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-60 and 35-1-62, when read 
together, clearly indicate that the Utah legislature intended 
5 
employer's immunity from common-law liability to be coterminous 
with their liability under the Utah Act. To the extent an 
employer is held liable as a result of the obligations mandated 
by the Utah Act, then the employer is entitled to immunity from 
common-law liability as provided in the Utah Act. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
By an Order of Dismissal dated January 28, 1988 and 
entered by the clerk on February 1, 1988, the Honorable Richard 
Moffat granted Gas-A-Mat's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 127-29, Order 
of Dismissal.) No memorandum decision was issued by the Court. 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
Gas-A-Mat requests this Court to affirm the decision of 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Gas-A-Mat acknowledges that this Court, when 
determining whether a trial court properly granted a Rule 12(6) 
Motion to Dismiss, will accept the factual allegations in the 
Complaint as true. However, only the well-pled facts of this 
plaintiff's Complaint, as distinguished from mere conclusory 
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allegations, must be accepted as true. Bailey v. Kirk, 111 F.2d 
567, 579 (10th Cir. 1985); Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 386 
(10th Cir. 1976). 
Paragraphs 35 and 36 of plaintiffs7 Complaint allege 
that at the time Maurine Hunsaker was kidnapped, she was employed 
by Gas-A-Mat as a cashier, and that her duties consisted 
primarily of monitoring the customers and receiving payments from 
them for the products purchased at the service station. There is 
no dispute that at the time of the regrettable incidents that led 
to Mrs. Hunsaker's death, she was in the course and scope of her 
employment. There was no dispute at the trial court below that 
the plaintiffs in this case had filed for workers compensation 
benefits under the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act and had 
received those benefits. (See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Appellees' 
Addendum, p. 1-3.) (R. 96-98.) 
Plaintiffs allege that in regard to Mrs. Hunsaker's 
employment, Gas-A-Mat was acting in "two capacities." 
(Plaintiffs' Complaint, f 37.) Plaintiffs assert that Gas-A-Mat 
was acting as both gasoline retailer and as a provider of 
security for the individual Gas-A-Mat stations. (Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, fj[ 39 & 42.) Plaintiffs further allege that in 
respect to its action as a provider of security, Gas-A-Mat was 
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negligent in failing to provide certain additional security and 
surveillance procedures at the various stations. (Plaintiffs7 
Complaint, 55 48-50.) 
Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege that "Gas-A-Mat 
security," as opposed to "Gas-A-Mat sales," was a separate and 
distinct corporate entity. Plaintiffs do not support the 
conclusory and speculative allegation about "Gas-A-Mat security" 
with any factual allegation concerning separate corporate form or 
identity. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 makes it clear that the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter the "Act") is the 
exclusive vehicle for recovery of compensation for injury or 
death, against the employer and other employees to the exclusion 
of "any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law 
or otherwise. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62, which permits 
suits for damages only against persons other than the employer, 
must be read in conjunction with the exclusivity provisions of 
§ 35-1-60. When the two sections are read together, it becomes 
clear that the Utah legislature intended the scope of employer's 
immunity from common-law liability to c^ i aspond to their 
responsibilities under the Act. 
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It is undisputed that in Utah, an employer is liable 
under the Act for a broad range of foreseeable events set in 
motion by an on-the-job injury. This broad obligation under the 
Act, however, also carries with it a broad grant of immunity. If 
the employer is held liable as a result of the obligations 
mandated by the Act, then the employer, to the same extent, is 
entitled to immunity from common-law liability as provided by 
§ 35-1-60. 
Adoption of the dual capacity doctrine as advocated by 
plaintiffs undermines the policies sought to be achieved by the 
Act. There are an endless number of situations in which 
employers engage in a course of conduct which could be construed 
as relating to workplace security. It would be an exercise in 
sophistry to attempt to draw any principled line of distinction 
between those situations in which employees could sue an employer 
and those in which the employee could not sue the employer. 
Application of the dual capacity doctrine to the facts 
of this case would gut the exclusive remedy provision for tens of 
thousands of Utah employees and their employers and the end 
result would be the undoing of Utah's workmen's compensation 
system. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT 
PROVIDES EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR 
DEATH OF EMPLOYEE AND "DUAL CAPACITY" 
DOCTRINE DOES NOT PROVIDE AN EXCEPTION 
TO THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION OF THE ACT 
Under the Utah Act, the right to recover worker's 
compensation is the employee's exclusive remedy against the 
employer and the employer's officers, agents, and employees for 
work-related injuries, including death. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-60. Once compensated, the employee has no other legal 
remedies against the employer.1 The statutory scheme is a 
1Morrill v. J&M Constr. Co., Inc., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981). 
In Morrill, a mother brought a wrongful death action against her 
son's employer after her son was killed during the course of his 
employment in a cave-in incident. In rejecting a constitutional 
attack on the exclusive remedy provision and in affirming the 
granting of summary judgment by the trial court, this court 
stated: 
Article XVI, Sec. 5 of our Constitution 
clearly accepts the exclusive Workmens 
Compensation Act remedy from any previous 
constitutional interdiction that the right of 
action in injury cases and damages therefore 
shall not be abrogated. We reaffirm our 
previous pronouncements and reaffirm the 
principle of exclusivity of right and remedy 
in the Workmens Compensation Act, under the 
facts of this case. A reading of Title 
35-1-60, U.C.A. 1953, makes it clear that the 
Act is the exclusive vehicle for recovery of 
compensation for injury or death, against the 
10 
legislative bargain in which the employer is held liable without 
fault for the work-related injuries of employees and the employee 
is limited to workers compensation as his exclusive remedy.2 
A. Utah Does Not Recognize Dual Capacity Doctrine. 
Utah does not recognize the dual capacity doctrine. 
Indeed, this Court refused to adopt the dual capacity doctrine in 
deciding the case of Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 678 (Utah 
1985). This Court also refused to adopt the dual capacity 
doctrine in Stewart v. CMI Corp., 740 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987). 
In CMI Corp., the personal representative of a deceased 
worker brought a wrongful death action against his employer and a 
third-party manufacturer on the theory of strict products 
liability. The plaintiff urged this Court to adopt the "dual 
capacityff exception to the workmen's compensation law. This 
Court reviewed its holding in Lagoon Corp. and- held: 
employer and other employees to the exclusion 
of uany and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise," and 
that it bars all next-of-kin or dependents, 
or anyone else, from using any other means of 
recovery against employers and others named 
in and covered by the Act, then the Act 
itself. 
635 P.2d at 89 (emphasis in original). 
2See Development, Utah Worker's Compensation and 
Occupational Disease Laws, 1983 Utah L. Rev. 573, 573-77. 
11 
In that case [Lagoon Corp.], the plaintiff 
asserted that her employer wore two hats: 
The first being that of an amusement park 
operator; the second, the hard hat of a 
contractor which was constructing the 
"Colossus" ride at the amusement park. We 
there rejected the argument that an employer 
occupies a separate capacity and owes 
separate duties to his employees as an owner 
of the premises than he does generally as an 
employer and declined to adopt the dual 
capacity doctrine under those circumstances. 
We similarly see no clear distinction in this 
case between the duties owed by an employer 
to furnish safe equipment for its employees 
when it purchases those tools, and the duties 
owed to its employees to furnish safe 
equipment when it has manufactured the tools 
itself. The dual capacity doctrine does not 
apply in this situation because the employer 
has not assumed a separate and distinct 
obligation toward his employee other than as 
employer. 
740 P.2d at 1341-42. 
This Court's rejection of the argument that an employer 
occupies a separate capacity and owes separate duties to its 
employees as an owner of premises (other than it would generally 
as an employer) is consistent with other case law and scholarly 
commentary. Professor Larson in his treatise 2 Larson's 
Workman's Compensation Law, § 72.81 (Desk Ed. 1990), states: 
It is held with virtual unanimity that an 
employer cannot be sued as an owner or 
occupier of land, whether the cause of action 
is based on common-law obligations of 
landowners or on statutes such as safe place 
statutes or structural work acts. 
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Apart from the basic argument that mere 
ownership of land does not endow a person 
with a second legal persona or entity, there 
is an obvious practical reason requiring this 
result. An employer, as part of his 
business, will almost always own or occupy a 
premises, and maintain them as an integral 
part of conducting his business. If every 
action and function connected with 
maintaining the premises could ground a tort 
suit, the concept of exclusiveness of remedy 
would be reduced to a shambles. 
B. Dual Capacity Doctrine Has Been Rejected Across the United 
States. 
As Professor Larson notes in his treatise, the dual 
capacity doctrine really "flourished in only two states, Ohio and 
California, and even there for only a few years, from 1977 to 
1983." Larson, supra, at § 72.81(c). The California legislature 
abolished the dual capacity doctrine and the Ohio Supreme Court 
laid the dual capacity doctrine to rest in Schump v. Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co., 44 Ohio St. 3d 148, 541 N.E.2d 1040 (1989).3 
Adoption of the dual capacity doctrine is inconsistent with 
the intent of the Utah legislature as evidenced in Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 35-1-60 & 62. The public policy considerations that underlie 
3The majority of federal courts have also rejected the dual 
capacity doctrine as incompatible with the Federal Employees 
Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101, et seq. See Votteler v. 
United States, 904 F.2d 128, 130 (2nd Cir. 1990); Wilder v. 
United States, 873 F.2d 285, 288-89 (11th Cir. 1989); Schmidt v. 
United States, 826 F.2d 227, 229-30 (3rd Cir. 1987); Gallo v. 
Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 776 F. Supp. 1478, 1482 (D. Colo. 
1991). 
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rejection of the dual capacity doctrine are set forth in State of 
Alaska v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979). In Purdy, the 
claimant received benefits under the state's Workmans 
Compensation Act, and then filed suit alleging the State, her 
employer, had failed to maintain properly the highway on which 
the injury occurred. The Alaska Supreme Court stated: 
Whatever frail vitality the dual capacity 
doctrine has in other jurisdictions, we do 
not think that it warrants adoption here. To 
do so might undermine extensively the 
policies sought to be achieved by the 
Workmans Compensation Act. There are 
endlessly imaginable situations in which an 
employer might owe duties to the general 
public, or to non-employees, the breach of 
which would be asserted to avoid the 
exclusive liability provision in our statute. 
It would be an enormous, and perhaps illusory 
task to draw a principled line of distinction 
between those situations in which the 
employee could sue and those in which he 
could not. The exclusive liability provision 
would, in any event, lose much of its 
effectiveness, and the workmans compensation 
system, as a whole, might be destablized. 
601 P.2d at 260. See also, Estate of Coates v. Pacific Eng'g, 
791 P.2d 1257, 1259-60 (Hawaii 1990) (rejecting dual capacity 
doctrine as incompatible with the exclusive remedy provision). 
Plaintiffs argue that Gas-A-Mat Corp. had a separate 
relationship to plaintiff's decedent when the corporation posted 
security signs, installed cashiers' booths, or otherwise took 
action as the owner and occupier of the retail gasoline station. 
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This relationship, however, is a relationship that hundreds, if 
not thousands of retail businesses in the State of Utah have with 
each of their employees. 
The dual capacity doctrine has proved historically to 
be the subject of misapplication and abuse and has been rejected 
across the United States.4 The common law is a series of 
experiments, some of which succeed and some of which fail. The 
dual capacity doctrine is a failed experiment. 
The adoption by this Court of plaintiffs' arguments 
would result in the modification of the exclusive remedy 
provision by judicial fiat. This court should reject the 
plaintiffs7 request to interfere with such a comprehensive 
legislative scheme. Such changes are best left to legislative, 
not judicial action. Franke v. Durkee, 141 Wis.2d 172, 413 
4See Coello v. Tug Mfg. Corp., 756 F. Supp. 1258, 1266 (W.D. 
Mo. 1991) (dual capacity doctrine not recognized in Missouri); 
Porter v. Bloit Corp., 391 S.E.2d 430, 432 (Ga. App. 1990); 
Barrett v. Rogers, 408 Mass. 614, 562 N.E.2d 480, 482-83 (Mass. 
1990) (any change in exclusive remedy provision is a public 
policy decision for the Legislature); Kaess v. Armstrong Cork 
Co., 403 N.W.2d 643, 645-46 (Minn. 1987); Millard v. Hyplains 
Dressed Beef, Inc., 237 Neb. 907, 468 N.W.2d 124, 128-29 (Neb. 
1991); McNeal v. Bil-Mar Foods of Ohio, Inc., 66 Ohio App. 3d 
588, 585 N.E.2d 892, 896-97 (Ohio App. 1990); Heimbach v. 
Heimbach, 584 A.2d 1008, 1009-11 (Pa. Super. 1991) ("we are aware 
that our holding today totally abrogates the doctrine of 'dual 
capacity.' Nonetheless, our supreme court's construction of 77 
P.S. § 483 as requiring compensation to be the exclusive 
liability of the employer for a compensable inquiry can logically 
lead to no other conclusion"). 
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N.W.2d 667, 670 (1987) (creation of exceptions to the exclusive 
remedy provisions of the workers, compensation statute is a 
matter of general policy and so lies within the province of the 
legislatures, not the courts). 
POINT H 
DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT APPLY 
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
In the early morning of July 5, 1982, Shelly Taynton 
was at work in a Uni-Marts convenience store as a retail clerk in 
Williamsport, Pennsylvania. She was shot and killed by David L. 
Sohmer. Her father filed an action and named as defendants 
Sohmer, Uni-Marts, and the store where Sohmer purchased the gun 
used in the shooting. Taynton's claim against Uni-Marts was 
based on the dual capacity doctrine. Taynton v. Dersham, 516 
A.2d 1241, 1242 (Penn. Super. 1986). 
The court noted that Uni-Marts was Ms. Taynton's 
employer and that she was on her employer's premises acting in 
the furtherance of her employer's business at the time of her 
death. "There is no allegation that she was killed by Sohmer for 
reasons personal to her. It was simply her misfortune to be 
minding the store at the time Sohmer entered." 516 A.2d at 1244. 
The court concluded under those facts that the exclusive remedy 
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provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Act should 
apply. 
The court then turned to the issue of whether the dual 
capacity doctrine could be invoked so as to remove the exclusive 
remedy shield from the employer. After examining earlier 
Pennsylvania precedent, and assuming, arguendo, that Pennsylvania 
law had recognized the dual capacity doctrine, the court found 
that it did not apply to the facts of the case before it. Id. at 
1246. In rejecting the application of the dual capacity 
doctrine, the courts noted that Ms. Taynton's death resulted from 
her presence at the store as an employee at the time Sohmer 
entered it. "Her injuries resulted from the fact she was on the 
job performing her duties as a retail clerk. These are precisely 
the type of injuries which the legislature intended to include 
within the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act." Id. 
Plaintiffs attempt to apply the dual capacity doctrine 
to a situation where an employer posts a security notice or 
installs cashier's booths stretches even this discredited 
doctrine beyond recognition. It is plaintiffs' argument that 
anytime an employer performs any act that purports to relate to 
the security of the workplace, then the employer steps out of its 
employment shoes and creates a separate and distinct relationship 
with its employees, that is, "provider of security." In that 
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situation, according to plaintiffs, the employer then has waived 
the protections of the exclusive remedy provision and is subject 
to suit by its employees. 
Under plaintiffs' theory, the owner of every 
convenience store, or other retail shop, that posts a sign that 
states that the employees do not carry any bills larger than 
$5.00 bills in the cash register after a certain time in the 
evening is creating a separate "security relationship" with its 
employees and is subject to direct suit by the employees under 
the dual capacity doctrine. If that is indeed the law in the 
State of Utah, no employer will be able to afford to lift a 
finger to engage in any type of conduct that will make the 
workplace safer. The application of the dual capacity doctrine 
to a factual situation such as this achieves the wrong result and 
is bad public policy. See Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 494 
S.W.2d 493 (Tenn. 1973) (fact that employer had built fence 
around parking lot and hired security guards did not waive 
exclusivity remedy under Compensation Act). 
This is a case in which plaintiffs attempt to pursue 
two theories of recovery rather than plaintiffs asserting claims 
against two distinct legal entities. Posting notices, putting up 
security lights, or even fencing parking lots, ought to be and 
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are part and parcel of the employer's role as employer. The dual 
capacity doctrine is inapplicable to the facts of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Gas-A-Mat Corp. respectfully 
request that this Court affirm the trial court's decision 
granting Gas-A-Mat's Motion to Dismiss on the merits and with 
prejudice. 
DATED t h : lis _J) day of H l / f t ^ 1992. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Gary L.XJohnson 
Attori^ys for JAp^ellee 
Gas-A-Mat Corp 
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ADDENDUM 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
* 
MICHAEL JIM HUNSAKER, surviving * 
spouse of, and * 
MATT HUNSAKER, * 
NICHOLAS HUNSAKER and * 
DANA HUNSAKER, minor dependent * 
children of * 
MAURINE FORSCHEN HUNSAKER, * 
deceased, * 
* 
Applicants, * 
* 
vs. * 
* 
GASAMAT OIL COMPANY and/or * 
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
On or about May 9, 1986, the carrier in this matter, National Union 
Fire Insurance, caused a form 151 to be filed with the Industrial Commission 
accepting liability for the industrial injury resulting in the death of 
Maurine F. Hunsaker on February 23, 1986, this accident having occurred during 
the course or scope of her employment with the defendant, Gasamat Oil 
Company• The defendants indicated that the Applicant was earning $3.50 per 
hour working seventeen hours per week, and that the decedent was married with 
three minor dependent children. Pursuant to Section 68 of the Workers' 
Compensation Act, the dependents of the deceased are entitled to two-thirds of 
her average weekly wage plus $5.00 for each dependent, not to exceed the 
average weekly wage of the deceased, which will entitle the dependents to 
compensation benefits of $59.50 per week payable for 312 weeks or a total of 
$18,564.00. 
Following the expiration of the benefits awarded herein, the 
Applicants may be entitled to continued benefits from the carrier, National 
Union Fire Insurance. Whether the dependents are entitled to additional 
benefits will depend on the amount of Social Security death benefits they are 
receiving at that time. Section 107 of the Act, provides that following the 
initial six year period of benefits, the carriers continuing liability for 
benefits is subject to a credit of 50% of any Social Security death benefits 
received by the dependents. Therefore, should the Applicants receive more 
than $515.00 per month in Social Security benefits, then the Applicants would 
be entitled to no further compensation benefits, and pursuant to Section 107 
of the Act, the carrier would be liable for the difference between $30,000.00 
and the $18,564.00 awarded to the dependents herein, or the sum of $11,436.00 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
MAURINE FORSCHEN HUNSAKER 
FINDING OF FACT 
PAGE TWO 
which would then be payable to the Default Indemnity Fund as provided in 
Section 107. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The dependents of Maurine Forschen Hunsaker are entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits as the result of her death of February 23, 1986, which 
occurred during the course or scope of her employment with the defendant, 
Gasamat Oil Company. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Gasamat Oil Company and/or National 
Union Fire Insurance pay to Michael Jim Hunsaker for the use and benefit of 
himself and the minor dependents of the deceased, compensation at the rate of 
$59,50 per-week-for 312 weeks or a total of $18,564.00, -which compensation 
shall commence effective February 24
 f 1986, with accrued amounts due and owing 
in B lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that National Union Fire Insurance shall pay 
the Applicants interest cof -8% per-annum on -the benefits accrued ^ between 
February 24, 1986 and the date they make their first payment of the benefits. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants, Gasamat Oil Company and/or 
National Union Fire Insurance, pay 'Richard -C.3^Hutchison, attorney for -the 
Applicants,--the .sum :of*$160.00,^f or services ^ rendered J.n this matter, the same 
to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the Applicants and remitted 
directly to his office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants, Gasamat Oil Company and/or 
National Union Fire Insurance, pay the statutory - funeral ^ allowance -of 
$1,800.00 ^to Michael *J,-rHunsaker, the same to be paid in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
S^ Timothy c/^Ailen 
Admini>Wative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
21 day of May, 1986 
ATTEST: 
/c/ T.inria J. Strasburq 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on May 21 , 1986 a copy of the attached Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed to the following persons at 
the following addresses, postage paid: 
Michael J. Hunsaker, 4887 South 4900 West, Kearns, Utah 84118 
Richard C. Hutchison, Attorney, 7050 Union Park Avenue, Suite 570, 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
National Union Fire Insurance, % American International Adjusting, 
P.O. Box 6159, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 Attn: Diane Barnett 
Suzan Pixton, Administrator, Default Indemnity Fund 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Barbara 
